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Coalitional game with opinion exchange
Bomin Jiang, Mardavij Roozbehani and Munther A. Dahleh
Abstract—In coalitional games, traditional coalitional game
theory does not apply if different participants hold different
opinions about the payoff function that corresponds to each
subset of the coalition. In this paper, we propose a framework in
which players can exchange opinions about their views of payoff
functions and then decide the distribution of the value of the
grand coalition. When all players are truth-telling, the problem
of opinion consensus is decoupled from the coalitional game,
but interesting dynamics will arise when players are strategic
in the consensus phase. Assuming that all players are rational,
the model implies that, if influential players are risk-averse,
an efficient fusion of the distributed data is achieved at pure
strategy Nash equilibrium, meaning that the average opinion
will not drift. Also, without the assumption that all players
are rational, each player can use an algorithmic R-learning
process, which gives the same result as the pure strategy Nash
equilibrium with rational players.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the application of game theory in multi-
agent systems has been receiving increasing attention. Those
applications include task allocation [1], smart grids [2],
transportation networks [3], sensor placement [4], and so
on. Although the theory of coalitional games has existed
for a few decades, theories for the case of unrealized payoff
functions (of subsets of players) are quite limited. In most
of the literature that considers coalitional game theory, an
oversimplified assumption is used, i.e., that all players agree
on a common sub-coalition payoff function.
Recently, researchers have started to look at this case in a
variety of ways, e.g., using the model of Bayesian games, bar-
gaining games, or repeated playing dynamic games. One pa-
per [5] derived a model that generalizes coalitional games to
a Bayesian framework using types. Furthermore, a Bayesian
core contract is defined as the set of contracts of payoff
distributions (Note that a contract is an agreement among
players about the payoff functions of players once the type
is realized) that are non-blocking under the expected value
of payoffs of players, whether Ex ante, Ex interim, or Ex
post. Note that non-blocking means one player is better off
staying in the grand coalition, so this player would not block
the formation of such a coalition. Similarly, another paper [6]
defined the concept of Bayesian core under uncertainty and
gave a bargaining algorithm that converges to the Bayesian
core, assuming that it exists. However, there are two practical
issues with the setting. First, the theory says nothing when
such a core does not exist; second, even if it does exist,
people’s individual observations, which are private, are not
used constructively because they do not exchange information
on private payoff functions. By exchanging information,
everyone can obtain a better estimate of the ground truth
of the payoff function. In addition, players will not follow
the algorithm in the literature when they are strategic and
want the algorithm to converge to some value in the core that
favors them. Finally, a fair distribution, such as the Shapley
value in the classical coalitional game model, is not well
defined because a commonly-accepted payoff function may
not exist. Another paper, [7], used a repeated playing model
and assumed that players learn the actual state of the world as
the game goes on, but, in practice, states may never converge
if the game that is being played is changing rapidly over time
or, even worse, if the game is only played once.
In reality, the realization of such a subcoalition payoff
function may involve opinion consensus, i.e., people’s views
of each other are affected by each other, and consensus
eventually reveals the truth. However, to date, there has been
virtually no work on the interplay between coalitional games
and opinion consensus theory. This paper takes an initial
step in this direction and shows that this model gives rise
to several interesting implications parallel to many social
phenomena. As noted before, in this model, players obtain a
better estimation of the ground truth of the payoff function
by exchanging information; a fair value distribution (i.e., the
Shapley value) is also well defined given some conditions for
efficient opinion exchange that are stated in the paper.
The proposed framework of the coalitional game with
information exchange results in three interesting phenom-
ena that relate to psychology and sociology. First, at the
equilibrium of this game, each participant should be a little
overconfident by exaggerating their own contribution in the
coalition. Second, in a rational player setting, if the members’
influences in a network are proportional to their risk-averse
levels, the opinion exchange process is efficient, i.e., it is
beneficial to an organization as a whole if more responsible
people are taking more important positions. Gradual opinion
exchange, instead of an instant opinion fusion, is necessary
when players are not fully rational.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
discusses existing models on coalitional games and opinion
consensus. In this section, Proposition 1 shows that with
large number of players, the Bayesian core as defined in
[8] is likely to be empty, and Proposition 2 gives conditions
for which linear opinion consensus could give non-empty
Bayesian core. However, the linear opinion consensus models
do not consider self-interested players, so a modified model
with self-interested players is also discussed. In addition,
Section III discusses system dynamics with self-interested
players in coalitional games with opinion exchange. In this
section, Theorem 1 gives conditions for which a coalitional
game with opinion exchange is efficient. Furthermore, con-
ditions for which a Bayesian core is non-empty are given in
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Proposition 4 with a consensus assumption, and Theorem 2
without the consensus assumption. Additionally, Section IV
shows that an R-learning algorithm can provide a player the
best strategy when other players are not rational, i.e., when
other players’ behaviors have to be learned. Additionally,
potential real world applications in both equity distribution
and legislation lobbying are given in Section V. Finally,
Section VI gives concluding remarks and discusses further
work.
II. COALITIONAL GAMES AND OPINION CONSENSUS
MODELS
In a classical coalitional game, it is assumed that the
sub-coalition payoff function is common knowledge for all
players. In this paper, this oversimplified assumption is
removed, and different sub-coalition payoff functions are
allowed. Those different sub-coalition payoff functions rep-
resent different evaluations of other players’ abilities, i.e.,
they are private opinions. As indicated in much of the social
science literature, people’s opinions can affect each other
substantially [9]. Thus, such opinion exchange requires a
new coalitional game model. Our paper, in particular, uses
the linear opinion consensus model [10] as a tool to in-
vestigate opinion exchange in coalitional games. Informally,
players first carry out opinion consensus, and then they
play the classical coalitional game to decide the fair payoff
distribution; a rigorous mathematical model of this process
is given later in this paper. However, the coalitional game
with opinion exchange is more than a coalitional game after
opinion consensus; during the opinion consensus process,
each participant is incentivized by her or is final payoff in the
coalitional game and may tell lies. That interaction generates
a coupling between the coalitional game and the opinion
consensus.
A. Notations and definitions
This subsection reviews notations and definitions used in
classical coalitional games and opinion consensus models.
Definition. [Supermodularity] Let N = {1, 2, · · · , n} be a
set of consecutive integers. Suppose f(·): 2N → R is a set
function. The set function v(C) is supermodular iff one of
the following equivalent conditions holds
1. ∀X ⊆ Y ⊆ N and x ∈ N\Y , there holds f(X∪{x})−
f(X) ≤ f(Y ∪ {x})− f(Y ), or
2. ∀X,Y ⊆ N , there holds f(X ∪ Y ) + f(X ∩ Y ) ≥
f(X) + f(Y ).
The set function is said to be strictly supermodular if the
inequalities in the above two equations are strict.
Definition. [Stochastic Matrix] A matrix W = [wij ] is called
a stochastic matrix iff
1. ∀i, j, wij ≥ 0, and
2. ∀i, there holds ∑j wij = 1
B. Coalitional game
The idea of linear consensus has been used extensively in
both engineering systems [11] and social networks [10]. Let
N = {1, 2, · · · , n} be a set of n players. In the classical
coalitional game setting, a subset C ⊆ N is called a sub-
coalition. A set function v(C) : 2N → R of the subcoalition
gives the payoff if sub-coalition C is formed. Note that
the cardinality of {C|C ⊆ N} is finite, so v(C) can be
represented as a vector, v.
In a coalitional game, we consider two major questions:
1. Is there a payoff allocation such that everyone is better-
off in the grand coalition? (This problem is solved by the
notion of core), and
2. Is there a payoff allocation which is fair to everyone?
(This problem is solved by the notion of Shapley value).
The core of a coalitional game is the set of payoff
allocation, gi, i ∈ N :
{gi|∀C ⊆ N,
∑
i∈C
gi ≥ v(C), and
∑
i∈N
gi = v(N)}
If the core of a coalitional game is not empty, then the
coalitional game has a stable solution, such that everyone is
better off staying in the grand coalition. Furthermore, the core
is non-empty as long as the payoff function is supermodular.
The Shapley value is a payoff allocation, gi, derived from
three fairness principles, i.e., symmetry, linearity, and null
player. This value is given by
gi = di(v) =
∑
C⊆N\{i}
|C|!(n− |C| − 1)!
n!
(v(C∪{i})−v(C))
The Shapley value defines a fair distribution of the total
payoff v(N).
Neither the stable core nor the Shapley value is well
defined without a subcoalition payoff function, v(C), which
is commonly accepted among all players. However, the
notion of a stable core is generalized in [12] and [5] as a
Bayesian core, where private sub-coalition payoff functions
are assumed. Note that the definitions of the Bayesian core
are different in the above two papers, and the definition in
our paper is similar to that in [12].
Definition 1. The Bayesian core is defined as the set of
value distributions, di, such that every player is better off
staying in the grand coalition. Mathematically, “better off”,
or rationality, is defined as
∀i,∀C $ N,
∑
j∈C
gj ≥ vi(C) (1)
where vi is private information of player i, charactering his
or her unique opinion of the game. Furthermore, there holds
the budget constraint
∀i,
∑
j∈N
gj ≤ vi(N) (2)
Now, a value distribution, di, is in the Bayesian core iff both
(1) and (2) hold.
The problem with the setting of the Bayesian coalitional
game is that, in many cases, the Bayesian core is empty
even though the core is not empty for each player i. That
is particularly true if the number of players, n, is large, as
illustrated by Lemma 1.
Proposition 1. Suppose that there is a strictly supermodular
ground truth payoff function v(C) : 2Ω → R (Note one
can represent the function as an m-vector). Further suppose
each player’s opinion vi ∼ N(v,Σi) is a sample from
the ground truth payoff function, where N(v,Σi) repre-
sents a truncated normal distribution with support vi ∈
{V |V vectorize vi(C) and vi(C) is supermodular}, and Σi
is a diagonal matrix with diagonal entries σ2i > 0. As the
number of players increases, i.e. n→∞, the Bayesian core
defined by (1) and (2) is empty with probability 1.
Proof. Proof by contradiction. Let S1 and S2 be partitions of
N . i.e., S1 ∩ S1 = ∅ and S1 ∪ S2 = N . Because each player
takes a sample from a Gaussian distribution,
lim
n→∞P{∃i, j, k, s.t. vi(S1) >
1
2
vk(N) and vj(S2) >
1
2
vk(N)} → 1
The “better off” condition defined by (1) gives
vk(N) < vi(S1) + vj(S2) ≤
∑
p∈S1
gp +
∑
p∈S2
gp =
∑
p∈N
gp
Now the inequality
∑
p∈N gp > vk(N) contradicts the
budget constraint defined by (2).
In the above proposition, even if each sampled value
function has non-empty core, the game itself has empty
Bayesian core.
C. Opinion consensus
The idea of linear consensus has been used extensively
in both engineering systems [13] and social networks [10].
Suppose a graph G = {N,E} characterizes the opinion
influence among a set of players N . There is an edge eij ∈ E
with weight wij ∈ (0, 1) if player i has a influence on player
j’s opinion. If there is not an edge between i and j, we set
wij = 0. Furthermore, wii = 1 −
∑
j 6=i wij ≥ 0. At each
time instance tk, player i hold an opinion of the function
vi(C)[k]. In fact, because the cardinality of {C|C ⊆ N} is
finite, one can consider vi(C)[k] as a vector vi[k].
In the classical opinion consensus literature, all players are
truth-telling. When all players are truth- telling, the problem
of opinion consensus is decoupled from the coalitional game.
Players just update their opinions according to the linear
opinion dynamics defined by
vi[k] =
∑
j
wijvj [k − 1]
In the above system, opinion consensus can be achieved, i.e.,
∀i, the limit limk→∞ vi[k] exists and ∀i, j, limk→∞ vj [k] =
limk→∞ vj [k], iff the stochastic matrix W = [wij ] has one
eigenvalue of 1 and all other eigenvalues are strictly in the
unit disk. If the opinion consensus can be achieved, one can
define a consensused payoff function v = limk→∞ vi[k].
After the opinion consensus, players can play the coalitional
game and a grand coalition exists iff the stable core of v is
non-empty. A set of sufficient conditions for which the stable
core of v is non-empty is given by Proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2. There exists a stable coalition under the
consensused payoff function v if all of the prior payoff
functions vi[1] are supermodular set functions.
Proof. First, note that if vi[k − 1] is supermodular, then
vi[k] =
∑
j wijvj [k − 1] is also supermodular. Since vi[1]
is supermodular, by induction, it follows that ∀k, vi[k] is
supermodular.
Because the set of supermodular set functions is closed,
the consensused payoff function v = limk→∞ vi[k] is su-
permodular. Since the stable core is non-empty as long as
the payoff function is supermodular, a stable coalition exists
under the consensused payoff function.
In reality, however, because players are incentivized by the
payoff distributions in the coalitional game, they do not nec-
essarily tell the truth during the opinion consensus process.
To incorporate this strategic aspect of opinion consensus,
a better model is required [14]. Assume that, at each time
instance, player i reveals an opinion, xi[k], that may or may
not be equal to vi[k]. Define θ ∈ (0, 1) as a trust parameter.
Now each player updates his or her opinion according to the
linear opinion dynamics defined by
vi[k] = θ
∑
j
wijxj [k − 1] + (1− θ)vi[k − 1]. (3)
The above opinion dynamics will be discussed in the next
section.
III. SYSTEM DYNAMICS WITH STRATEGIC PLAYERS
As pointed out in Section II-C, the system dynamics are
trivial when all players are truth-telling because the opinion
consensus and coalitional game are decoupled. This chapter
discusses the opinion dynamics when players may tell lies to
get themselves better payoff distributions. We refer to such
players as strategic players.
A. Enforcing effective information exchange
In the rational player setting, if telling a lie has no cost,
the game becomes a cheap-talk game [15]. Players will not
trust any information, and there is no efficient information
exchange. Similar problems exist under the cognitive hi-
erarchical model [16], where the opinions will not reach
consensus because the second level players again form a
cheap-talk game, even though the first level players may tell
the truth. We would like to investigate this type of bounded
rationality models in future work.
In our coalitional game setting, each player’s private
knowledge of the sub-coalition payoff function can be viewed
as a sample of the ground truth. People enter the opinion
consensus to acquire information on other samples, and
hence acquire a better understanding of the ground truth.
However, revealing false information to others will introduce
bias. Hence, it is useful to introduce a disutility when false
information is revealed so that players become risk-averse,
and effective information exchange is established.
B. Rational and risk-averse players
Consider a ground truth payoff function v(·). Suppose it
is normalized, i.e. v(∅) = 0 and v(N) = 1. When we write
it in its vector form, each entries in v are v(C), ∅ ( C ( N
(hence it is an m-vector, m = 2N − 2). Note v(C), ∅ (
C ( N is unknown to players. Further suppose that each
player’s private initial opinion at time instance k = 0 is an
i.i.d. sample vi[0] ∼ N(v,Σi), where Σi = σ2i I and I is the
identity matrix. Let the influence among players denoted by
W = [wij ]. In addition, define weight of opinions as ti such
that limk→∞W k = 1n
[
t1 t2 · · · tn
]
(1n denotes
n dimensional column-1-vector), then vˆ[0] = A[vi[0]] =∑
i tivi[0] is an unbiased estimator of v. If it happens that
ti =
1
σ2i
/
∑
i
1
σ2i
, then vˆ[0] is the ML estimator. Note that
A[·] denotes weighted average. Note [wij ] and ti are also
common knowledge; the only private information to player i
is its opinion vi[k].
Suppose the payoff v(N) is allocated according to Shapley
value di(vˆ[K]) of the average opinion vˆ[K] at step K.
Because the Shapley ratio defines a linear function, we can
also refer this final payment to player i as 1n+d
T
i vˆ[K], where
dTi is a m-vector. Note the property of Shapley value gives∑
i d
T
i = 0. If every player is truth telling, then the system
reaches consensus, i.e. ∀i, limk→∞ vi[k] = vˆ, and the final
payoff function is an unbiased estimator.
Now, assume that players can tell lies. Each player may
introduce some fraud at step k: uj [k] = xj [k]−vj [k], but, at
the same time, these fraudulent statements undermine trust
in the system, and, hence, they introduce disutility 1T var[u],
where var[u] =
∑
i ti (ui[k])
2− (∑i tiui[k])2 (Note that this
disutility metric is a scalar, and it can be interpreted as the 1-
norm of the variance of ui[k]). After K steps of playing, the
overall disutility due to fraud is given by 1T
∑K
k=1 var [u[k]].
Each player makes a trade-off between 1T
∑K
k=1 var [u[k]]
and di(A[v[K]]) by solving the minimization problem
arg min
ui[k],k=1,2,···
pi · 1T
K∑
k=1
var [u[k]]− dTi A[v[K]] (4)
where pi is the risk-averse factor of player i.
Lemma 1. In the coalitional game with opinion exchange
(which follows the system dynamics (3)), there holds
A[v[K]] = θA[u[K−1]]+A[v[K−1]] =
∑
k
θA[u[k]]+A[v[0]]
Proof. Let T = [ti], W = [wij ], V [k] = [vi[k]], X[k] =
[xi[k]] and U [k] = [ui[k]]. By definition
A[v[k + 1]] = T>V [k + 1]
Substitute (3) into the above equation. We obtain
A[v[k + 1]] = T> (θWX[k] + (1− θ)V [k])
By the definition of ui in the last subsection, it holds that
A[v[k + 1]] = T> (θW (V [k] + U [k]) + (1− θ)V [k])
= T>θWV [k] + T>θWU [k] + (1− θ)T>V [k]
According to the definition of ti, the influence among play-
ers satisfies limk→∞W k = 1n
[
t1 t2 · · · tn
]
, i.e.,
T>W = T>. Therefore
A[v[k + 1]] = T>θV [k] + T>θU [k] + (1− θ)T>V [k]
= T>V [k] + θT>U [k]
=
∑
k
θA[u[k]] + A[v[0]]
From Lemma 1, we obtain
arg min
ui[k],k=1,2,···
pi · 1T
K∑
k=1
var [u[k]]− dTi A[v[K]]
= arg min
ui[k],k=1,2,···
K∑
k=1
(
pi · 1T var [u[k]]− θdTi A[u[k]]
)
That says that the optimal strategy is indeed a myopic
strategy. Therefore, one can seek to find the optimal strategy
step-by-step. In step k, it holds that
arg min
ui[k]
pi · 1T var [u[k]]− θdTi A[u[k]]
= arg min
ui[k]
pi · 1T
∑
j
tj (uj [k])
2 −
∑
j
tjuj [k]
2

− θdTi
∑
j
tj · uj [k]
Set the first derivative with respect to ui to zero
2pi
tiui[k]− ti
∑
j
tjuj [k]
 = tidiθ (5)
The above equation defines the best strategy of player i
given the actions of the other players. The linear equations
above can be used to solve for pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium. Note that the coefficient matrix of the above linear
equations has the rank of n− 1, so there are multiple Nash
equilibria.
Suppose for now that the weight pi of disutility is pro-
portional to player i’s influence ti in the network, i.e.
pi ∝ ti. Further because of the property of the Shapley value,∑
j dj = 0, one can obtain a solution of (5) as
ui[k] =
diθ
2pi
(6)
The above solution is a pure strategy Nash-equilibrium,
and it yields ∀i, ui 6= 0, and
∑
i tiui[k] = 0. In addition,
at the equilibrium, vi[k] will converge, but not achieve
consensus. The larger the value of pi is, the smaller the
opinion divergence is, and the more likely that di(vˆ[∞]) is a
stable coalition for all players.
Remark 1. In practice, the assumption of pi ∝ ti, i.e., the
weight pi of disutility is proportional to player i’s influence
ti, implies that more responsible players are placed at more
important positions in a network.
Definition 2. A coalitional game with information exchange
is efficient if there exists a Nash equilibrium such that the
average opinion is constant, i.e. vˆ[k] is constant for all time
instances k.
Theorem 1. In the fully rational risk-averse player scenario,
i.e., opinion dynamics follows (3) and strategic players min-
imize the objective function (4), the coalitional game with
information exchange is efficient if pi ∝ ti over all players.
Proof. Let T = [ti], W = [wij ], V [k] = [vi[k]], X[k] =
[xi[k]] and U [k] = [ui[k]]. By Lemma 1,
vˆ[k + 1] = T>V [k] + θT>U [k]
Given pi ∝ ti, the optimal strategy for each rational risk-
averse player is given by (6). Because the solution (6) satisfies∑
i tiui[k] = 0, i.e. T
>U [k] = 0, we find that
vˆ[k + 1] = T>V [k] = vˆ[k]
is invariant over time steps k.
C. Existence of stable coalition
This subsection discusses conditions for non-empty
Bayesian core. Assuming that consensus is achieved, Proposi-
tion 3 gives a sufficient condition for which a stable coalition
exists.
Proposition 3. Suppose that consensus is achieved. There is
a stable coalition under the consensused payoff function if
all of the prior payoff functions vi[0] and all the reported
payoff functions xi[k] are supermodular set functions.
Proof. First, we want to show that ∀k, vi[k] is supermodular.
Let k ≥ 2 be given. If vi[k − 1] is supermodular, then
vi[k] = θi
∑
j wijxj [k− 1] + (1− θi)vi[k− 1], as a positive
weighted average of supermodular set functions, is also
supermodular. In addition, because vi[1] are supermodular,
by induction, we know that ∀k, vi[k] is supermodular.
Given that all payoff functions in step k are supermodular,
and because the set of supermodular set functions is a closed
set, and further because v = limk→∞ vi[k], the consensused
payoff function v is supermodular. Furthermore, because the
Shapley value of a supermodular payoff function is in the
stable core, we reach the conclusion that there is a stable
coalition under the consensused payoff function.
In the above proposition, the assumption of achieved con-
sensus may be too strong in practice. Therefore, in Theorem
2, the assumption of achieved consensus is removed, and a
stable coalition is shown to exist when po is sufficiently large.
Theorem 2. Assume that pi ∝ ti over all players, and define
po = pi/ti. Then vi[∞] = limk→∞ vi[k] exists. In addition,
if vi[0] is strictly supermodular for any given set of initial
states vi[0], i ∈ N , then ∃po > 0 s.t. the Bayesian core is
non-empty with subcoalition payoff functions vi[∞], that is,
the Bayesian core is non-empty after the opinion consensus
process.
Proof. Because ∀i ∈ N , vi[0] is strictly supermodular, vˆ[0],
the weighted average of all vi[0], is also strictly supermod-
ular. Further because pi ∝ ti over all players, the average
opinion vˆ[k] is invariant over time step k, hence vˆ[k] = vˆ[0]
is strictly supermodular.
Moreover, given the optimal strategy solution (6), one can
rewrite the system dynamics of (3) as
vi[k] = θ
∑
j
wij
(
vj [k − 1] + diθ
2poti
)
+ (1− θ)vi[k − 1]
Define V [k] = [vi[k]], X[k] = [xi[k]], U [k] =
[
diθ
2poti
]
,
W = [wij ] and W = θW+(1−θ)I . Because W is a stochas-
tic matrix, the limits limk→∞W k and limk→∞W
k
exist and
are equal to each other. We define T = limk→∞W k =
limk→∞W
k
. A stochastic matrix has a eigenvalue equals
1 and all other eigenvalues inside the unit disk, so one can
define an eigenvalue decomposition W = D−1 [S1 + S2]D,
where S1 =

1 0 · · · 0
0 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 0
 and S2 is a diagonal matrix
with the first entry 0 and all other entries inside the unit disk.
The system dynamics is given by
V [k] = θW (V [k − 1] + U) + (1− θ)V [k − 1]
= WV [k − 1] + θWU
= W
k
V [0] + θW
(
I +W +W
2
+ · · ·+W k−1
)
U
If we further consider the eigenvalue decomposition W =
D−1 [S1 + S2]D, we obtain
V [k] = W
k
V [0] + θWD>
[
I + (S1 + S2) + (S1 + S2)
2
+ · · · (S1 + S2)k−1
]
DU
= W
k
V [0] + θWD>
[
I + S2 + S
2
2 + · · ·Sk−12
]
DU
+ (k − 1)θWTU
Because the solution (6) satisfies
∑
i tiui = 0, i.e. TU = 0,
it holds that
V [k] = W
k
V [0] + θWD>
[
I + S2 + S
2
2 + · · ·Sk−12
]
DU
Considering the fact that S2 is a diagonal matrix with
all entries in the unit disk, when k → ∞, the series
I + S2 + S
2
2 + · · ·Sk−12 converges to (1 − S2)−1. Further
because limk→∞W k = T , we obtain
lim
k→∞
V [k] = TV [0] + θWD>(1− S2)−1DU
Recall that we have U =
[
diθ
2poti
]
, hence,
lim
po→∞
lim
k→∞
V [k] = TV [0]
i.e.,
lim
po→∞
vi[∞] = vˆ[∞]
Given that vˆ[∞] is strictly supermodular, the Shapley value
d(vˆ[∞]) is in the interior of the core of the coalitional game
with subcoalition payoff functions vˆ[∞]. For each player i,
limpo→∞ vi[∞] = vˆ[∞] and the mapping from vi[∞] to the
core is continuous. Hence, for sufficiently large po, d(vˆ[∞])
is also in the core of the coalitional game with subcoalition
payoff function vi[∞], concluding the proof.
IV. ALGORITHMIC PLAYING
In the above analysis, we made the assumption that all
of the players are rational. In the case in which all players
are fully rational and risk-averse, an equilibrium exists and
convergence can be achieved. However, from a single player’s
perspective, he or she does not have control over how the
other players play. What should a player do if he or she is
fully rational while others are not? In this section, we show
that an R-learning algorithm [17] can provide such a player
the best strategy.
A. R-Learning Formulation
At each step k, the reward of a rational player is given by:
ri[k] = −pi · 1T var [u[k]] + θdTi A [u[k]]
Define s[k] = A [v[k]] as the state and ui as the action of
each player i. For convenience, let i− denote the players
other than player i. Furthermore, because all of the state
variables and action variables are continuous, a model of
environment (i.e., action pattern of players i−) with finite
parameters must be defined prior to the learning process.
Thus we define the environment e =
[
A [ui−[k]]
var [ui−[k]]
]
,
and the environment model pe(e|s, var [u[k − 1]] ; Φ) as the
probability distribution of e given state s, parameterized by
Φ. Note Φ is the set of finite environment parameters to
be learned. In addition, the environment e is independent of
current action ui, but the rewards and next state are functions
of environment e and the action ui.
𝑢𝑖[𝑘 + 1]
𝑠[𝑘 + 1]
𝔼 𝑣[𝑘 + 1]
𝑠[𝑘]
𝔼 𝑣[𝑘]
𝑒[𝑘 + 1] ∼ 𝑝𝑒(𝑒|𝑠 𝑘 , var 𝑢[𝑘] ;Φ)
Fig. 1. States transition of R-learning
One may find it problematic that the states and the
associated rewards are not observable for player i, hence
the learning process cannot proceed unless var [u[k]] and
A [v[k]] are broadcast centrally. Furthermore, A [v[k]] cannot
be obtained so even a central broadcast would be problematic.
However, the rewards in each step depend only on the
decision variable and environment, but not directly on any
state variable; i.e., the impact of state variables only goes
into the system via environment e. As a result, the choice
of state variables in the R-learning process depends only on
how i− players are modeled, and it is possible to choose
state variables other than A [v[k]], e.g. A [x[k]].
Remark 2. In Section IV, if everyone is rational and adopts
the R-learning algorithm, then (6) is the optimal strategy. In
this case, although Section IV and Subsection III-B have the
same objective function and the same optimal strategy, some
assumptions are different, i.e., Subsection III-B assumes that
all players know that all players are rational. However,
Section IV does not have this assumption, but it requires
that var [u[k]] and A [v[k]] can be broadcast centrally.
Remark 3. The learning process justifies the need for gradual
consensus of opinion, i.e., the participants learn each other’s
patterns during the consensus process.
B. Simulations
As an illustrative example, first, we look at a two-player
coalitional game with opinion exchange. Suppose player
2’s expressed opinion is quasilinear in its true opinion and
depends on the mean opinion, i.e. x2[k + 1] = v2[k + 1] +
f (A [x[k]]) + w where w is white noise. Further, assume
that player 1 is a risk-averse, rational player as defined in
Subsection III-B, and uses an R-learning algorithm to learn
the f(·) function during the opinion consensus process to
maximize his or her own utility in the coalitional game.
From player 1’s perspective, his or her optimal strategy is
given by the solution of (5)
2p1 (u1[k]− (t1u1[k] + t2u2[k])) = d1θ
u∗1[k + 1] =
d1θ
2p1(1− t1) +
t2f¯ (A [x[k]])
1− t1
where f¯ (·) is player 1’s estimate of f (·).
In the simulation, assume that v({1, 2}) = 1, v({∅}) = 0
, vi[k] =
[
v({1})
v({2})
]
. Let the initial conditions be v1[0] =[
0.7
0.1
]
and v2[0] =
[
0.3
0.5
]
. Furthermore, let the system
parameters be θ = 0.1, W =
[
0.3 0.7
0.4 0.6
]
. Player 1 has
the probability of γ = 0.5 of implementing the optimal
strategy given its current estimate f¯ (·) (exploitation), and
this player has the probability of 1 − γ of carrying out
exploration. Further assume that both players are rational and
risk-averse, but do not know that their opponents are rational.
The coalitional game with information exchange in this case
will be efficient, i.e. d(vˆ[k]) is invarient over k, as shown in
the example in Figure 2.
V. REAL WORLD APPLICATIONS
Deciding equity distribution is a critical step in forming
a startup company [18]. For a long period of time, it has
been regarded as a problem that is often solved case by case
relying on experience. For example, [18] suggests that equity
distribution should consider “past and future contributions,”
but those contributions are very subjective. To avoid this
subjectivity, [19] argues that everyone who joins the startup
at the same time should receive equal shares.
Recent years there are some theories and practices trying
to deal with this problem in a systematic way. To date,
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Fig. 2. True opinion v[k] when γ = 0.8. Here both players are rational
and risk-averse. Both players are doing R-learning to learn the behavior of
their opponents.
the most suitable theory is the Shapley value in coalitional
game theory, in which payoffs are distributed according to
the contribution of each of the sub-coalitions and the three
axioms of fairness [20]. An online tool, “Startup Equity
Calculator,” [21] implements this idea by asking the question
“What will the company look like without this particular
founder?”, which essentially evaluates the contribution of
each of the sub-coalitions.
However, the above ideas of the Shapley value assume
that everyone will agree on the contribution of each of the
sub-coalitions. In practice, different people have different
opinions about the contribution of each of the sub-coalitions,
hence a coalitional game theory with incomplete information
is required, such as the one in this paper.
As another example, in the United States, passing legis-
lation requires substantial effort and extensive lobbying and
debates, and the same game is not played repeatedly. Thus,
a repeated game model in the paper [12] is not applicable.
In contemporary U.S. politics, in addition, it is usually the
case that the Bayesian core, defined in [5] does not exist,
because the two parties have strong prejudices about each
other. Moreover, the opinion exchange process affects the
outcomes substantially, so a model, such as an opinion
consensus model, is required to capture its effect. At the end,
each Senator and Representative has her or his own interests
and cares almost exclusively about the welfare of his or her
own constituents.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, a new framework for coalitional games
is presented with an unrealized subset payoff function and
information exchange among players. The framework creates
an interplay between the traditional model of the coalitional
game and the opinion consensus model. Many interesting
implications arise from the new framework, including the
sufficient condition of non-stable core and the sufficient
condition of efficient information exchange. Furthermore, the
case of algorithmic learning players was studied, and the
results were compared and connected to the case of pure
rational players.
In the future, the dependency of equilibrium on the topol-
ogy of the opinion consensus network may be considered. It
is clear that different communication topologies will result in
different steady states. From the perspective of an investor in
the business scenario, there is a need to design a communica-
tion topology and rule (mechanism) that ensures truth telling.
From the perspective of the participants, questions may arise
concerning with whom and in what order should issues be
addressed to ensure favorable outcomes. Additional future
work that is needed is related to algorithmic learning. In this
approach, quantizing the rewards associated with the possible
“exit” action of each player also could be considered.
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